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Abstract 
Current aviation security systems identify behavioural indicators of deception to 
assess risks to flights, but they lack a strong psychological basis or empirical 
validation. We present a new method that tests the veracity of passenger accounts. In 
an in-vivo double-blind randomised-control trial conducted in international airports, 
security agents detected 66% of deceptive passengers using the veracity test method 
compared with less than 5% using behavioural indicator recognition. As well as 
revealing advantages of veracity testing over behavioural indicator identification, the 
study provides the highest levels to date of deception detection in a realistic setting 
where the known base rate of deceptive individuals is low. 
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“You have to measure whether what we’re doing is the only way to assure ... safety. 
And you also have to think are there ways ... that are less intrusive” (Barak Obama, 
Lisbon, November 2010). 
 
Identifying threats presents a huge challenge to those tasked with ensuring 
public safety, and to psychologists developing methods for detecting deception. 
However, the news from both arenas is not good. Since the events of September 11 
2001, billions of dollars have been invested in aviation security procedures designed 
to detect threats to airplanes (US-GAO, 2011), but the effectiveness of these 
procedures has been questioned (Weinberger, 2010). More recent events such as the 
2009 attempted bombing of Flight NW253 to Detroit suggest we still lack effective 
ways of identifying threats to public safety. Threat detection procedures typically 
involve looking for individuals who display behaviours thought to be indicators of 
deception, particularly behaviours shown by the perpetrators of previous attacks. The 
effectiveness of behavioural indicator approaches has never been tested in a large-
scale field trial. However, a meta-analysis of laboratory studies that used behavioural 
indicators to discriminate deceivers from truth-tellers revealed a mean rate for correct 
identification of 54%, only marginally above chance (Bond & de Paulo, 2006).  
In this paper, we present a new procedure for aviation security screening that 
is based, not on behavioural indicators selected from previous incidents, but on testing 
the veracity of passengers’ verbal accounts. Our approach takes techniques derived 
from psychological theory and shown in recent laboratory studies to yield promising 
rates of deception detection, and integrates them into a comprehensive procedure for 
detecting threat.  We then compare the effectiveness of behavioural-indicator and 
veracity-testing approaches in an in-vivo empirical evaluation conducted with 
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passengers departing on flights at international airports during routine security 
screening.  
Approaches to Detecting Deception 
The majority of published research on detecting deception has set out to 
identify indicators in human behaviour that can discriminate deceivers from truth-
tellers.  Behavioural indicators of deception fall into two main categories: physical 
behaviours relating to demeanour (e.g., nervousness; aggression) and/or actions (e.g., 
eye contact, fidgeting); and verbal behaviours relating to the nature and production of 
speech (e.g., hesitations, use of pronouns).  As noted above, behavioural indicator 
approaches typically yield low discrimination rates (Bond & de Paulo, 2006). 
However, there is some evidence that counts of illustrators (i.e., hand movements to 
indicate content or prosody) can provide reasonable levels of discrimination (de Paulo 
et al, 2003), but the range of practical contexts in which illustrators can be used is 
limited (e.g., real-time detection of differences in the use of illustrators is likely to 
prove impractical). According to Levine (2010), the slight but above significance rate 
of 54% successful detection arises, not because judges of deceptive behaviour have 
some degree of competence at identifying relevant behavioural indicators, but because 
there are generally a few deceivers in any study who are particularly poor at masking 
their lies. 
Low rates of deception detection from behavioural indicators arise, according 
to Levine, Kim and Blair (2010), for four reasons: a lack of indictors with predictive 
validity; naive beliefs in the predictive validity of certain indicators (e.g., avoidance 
of eye contact); ignoring information that may indicate deception (e.g., failing to spot 
inconsistencies in an account); and truth bias, that is, a predisposition to assume the 
truth of another person’s account. In their ‘Dangerous Decisions Theory’, Porter, 
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Gustaw and ten Brinke (2010) argue that an initial schema formed from 
misinterpreted behavioural indicators biases people’s judgements about deception, 
leading to irrational decision-making in the face of contradictory evidence. Despite 
these concerns, it has been suggested that deception research has “been characterized 
by a myopic focus on the internal psychological states and corresponding non-verbal 
behaviors of liars and has failed to adequately consider the situation and context in 
which truths and lies are told” (Blair, Levine, & Shaw, 2010, p. 423). As we argue 
below, the same focus is apparent in current security screening practices. 
Veracity testing offers an alternative approach to detecting deception that 
focuses, not on displayed behavioural characteristics of deceivers, but on the nature of 
the verbal exchange between the sender (the individual attempting to deceive) and the 
receiver (the individual attempting to detect deception). Recent laboratory studies 
have revealed five aspects of verbal exchanges that discriminate deceivers from truth-
tellers. First, some of the most successful deception detection methods use evidence 
to challenge accounts during interviews. Evidence-based methods yield up to 75% 
detection with scripted questions (Blair, Levine, & Shaw, 2010; Levine, Shaw & 
Shulman, 2010) and 68% with questions created in real time (Dando & Bull, 2011; 
Dando, Bull, Ormerod, & Sandham, 2013).  
Second, questioning styles that elicit rich verbal accounts are also effective in 
discriminating between truth-tellers and liars (Milne & Bull, 1999; Oxburgh & 
Dando, 2011; Oxburgh, Myklebust, & Grant, 2010). Open questions do not constrain 
responses, but necessitate the provision of expansive answers. Importantly, answers to 
open questions commit passengers to an account of the truth concerning issues such 
as identity, background, and previous, current or future activities.  
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Third, tests of expected knowledge, which compare the content of what 
someone says with information already known, are useful for detecting deception 
(Blair, Levine, & Shaw, 2010). For example, if you claim to have studied at Oxford 
University, it would be reasonable to expect you to know how to travel on public 
transport from the train station to your college. Lack of knowledge and an inability to 
explain its absence, or a marked change in verbal behaviour when providing answers, 
may suggest that the information supplied initially may not be veridical. 
Fourth, interviewing methods that restrict the verbal manoeuvring of deceivers 
are also shown to be effective (e.g., Dando & Bull, 2011; Taylor et al., 2013). Verbal 
manoeuvring involves the strategic manipulation by deceivers of verbal content and 
delivery, which is intended to control a conversation in order to avoid detection. The 
quantity of verbalisations produced by deceptive individuals (measured in terms of 
number of words), and the information content of their verbalisations, tend to vary 
according to the nature of a verbal exchange. Specifically, deceptive individuals tend 
to be as verbose as truthful individuals when they are in control of the conversation 
(e.g., during early exchanges), and they tend to produce as much unsolicited 
information (and sometimes more) than truth-tellers. However, deceivers become less 
verbose and deliver less information than truth-tellers when their accounts are being 
challenged under questioning (Dando et al., 2012). 
Fifth, procedures that raise the cognitive load faced by an interviewee 
typically yield better rates of discrimination between deceivers and truth-tellers 
(Walczyk, Igou, Dixon & Tcholakian, 2013). For example, asking unanticipated 
questions during interviews has been shown to raise the cognitive load of deceivers 
more than truth-tellers, leading to higher detection rates (Vrij et al, 2009).  
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The techniques described above provide building blocks for constructing an 
effective method of detecting deception during security interviews. Psychological 
research has been used to good effect to design practical methods for interviewing 
witnesses and victims, notably the cognitive interview (see Fisher & Geiselman, 
1992). In our view, the same approach can be adopted to designing methods for 
interviewing to detect deception, but to date no composite psychologically-based 
methods have been designed for interviewing those suspected of wrongdoing 
(suspects) outside of laboratory studies. Of course, aviation security interviews are not 
suspect interviews, but the same requirement to discriminate between truth-tellers and 
deceivers arises.  
Aviation Security Screening to Detect Deception 
Most current aviation security procedures rely on the identification of 
behavioural indicators (e.g., Reddick, 2004; British Security Industry Association, 
2008). A common method for screening airline passengers prior to embarking on 
long-haul flights involves the detection of ‘suspicious signs’ during a short interview 
between security agent and passenger (Martonosi & Barnett, 2006). In the interview 
the agent asks a series of scripted security-related questions that are the same for 
every passenger. During questioning, agents look for indicators, which are typically 
behaviours associated with previous security incidents. These signs focus on aspects 
of a passenger’s verbal and non-verbal behaviours, disposition (e.g., nervousness) and 
appearance (e.g., inappropriate dress for the intended trip) that may be indicators of 
deceit or threat1. 
In the light of the psychological literature that reveals problems with 
behavioural indicator approaches, we have developed a new security screening 
                                                1	  In	  the	  interests	  of	  national	  security	  we	  cannot	  provide	  in	  full	  the	  specific	  behavioural	  indicators	  that	  are	  used	  in	  the	  suspicious	  signs	  method.	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method, which we call Controlled Cognitive Engagement (CCE). The name refers to 
the decision-making skills used by the security agent to control an interview so that a 
passenger provides information that can be tested for veracity. CCE embodies each of 
the five techniques shown in laboratory studies to improve deception detection rates: 
Use of evidence; tests of expected knowledge; effective questioning styles; 
observation of verbal manoeuvring; and asymmetric cognitive loading. Information 
revealed in the responses to open questions by the passenger in a CCE security 
interview is used by the agent to construct questions that provide tests of expected 
knowledge. The interview procedure has phases, but the questions within each phase 
are not scripted. Instead, agents are trained to use a question construction algorithm 
that allows the generation of in excess of 1.8m different questions. Therefore, the 
precise questioning cannot be anticipated by the passenger. CCE is designed to raise 
the cognitive load faced by deceptive passengers (based on the assumption that 
passengers who pose a threat to a flight will have to be deceptive if questioned 
appropriately). At the same time, cognitive load is minimised for legitimate 
passengers, who experience what appears to be a friendly and informal conversation, 
albeit that the conversation is managed. That is, the security agent is seamlessly 
directing the course and progress of the conversation to fulfil specific psychological 
and practical objectives (e.g., Shepherd, 2007).       
CCE is applied during a short interview between security agent and passenger, 
as follows: An initial phase of rapport building establishes a baseline for the 
passenger’s verbal behaviour, in which they respond to neutral questions that anyone, 
regardless of intent, could answer truthfully. Passengers are then asked open 
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questions. Agents develop questions in real time using a proprietary method2 that 
combines one or more selected topic dimensions (e.g., education, family, travel, work, 
skills, interests) and temporalities (past, current, future), and varying question styles, 
purpose and length, to derive questions that cannot be predicted in advance. The 
account given by a passenger in response to an open question is then tested for 
veracity, using focused ‘test’ questions that seek information the passenger should 
possess if their account is true. Agents assess the veracity of accounts from the 
answers given by passengers to questions. Although agents can quickly access 
Internet resources using a hand held device to check the accuracy of some answers 
given by passengers, they are discouraged from doing so. Instead, they are trained to 
look for changes in the depth and quality of answers during the interview (i.e., as a 
deceptive passenger becomes aware that their account is being assessed or 
challenged). Cycles of open and test questions repeat with different topics and 
temporal domains, after which the agent makes a decision regarding the passenger’s 
risk status.  
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Aviation Security Screening Procedures  
Recent research highlights the importance of context in assessing the 
effectiveness of methods for detecting mal-intent (Blair, Levine, & Shaw, 2010). 
Human behaviour is inherently determined by the situation in which actions arise 
(Ross & Nisbett, 1991). To date, there have been no large-scale field trials of aviation 
security screening methods. Some proponents of behavioural indicators (e.g., Ekman, 
2009) have noted the difficulty of trialling approaches in controlled studies that 
cannot involve genuine threat (Weinberger, 2010), because of the difficulty in a mock 
passenger study of creating the high stakes faced by perpetrators of real attacks. Yet, 
                                                2	  As	  with	  the	  suspicious	  signs	  of	  current	  screening	  methods,	  the	  precise	  algorithm	  underlying	  the	  proprietary	  question	  design	  method	  of	  CCE	  cannot	  be	  published	  for	  reasons	  of	  national	  security.	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as Blair, Levine, and Shaw point out, the effectiveness of any method for detecting 
deception is likely to be influenced strongly by the context in which it is applied. 
To address the gap in knowledge about how security screening methods fare 
in real task environments, we conducted the first in-vivo evaluation of a suspicious 
signs method conducted in a real airport, and compared it to CCE. The study reported 
below provides a randomised-control, double-blind field trial of these aviation 
security-screening methods. We collected data at five international airports during 
routine security activities, in which mock and real passengers passed through a 
security interview prior to check-in for long-haul flights. Mock passengers were 
incentivised to attempt to pass through security undetected while giving untruthful 
answers during the screening interview. We hypothesised that security agents using 
CCE would detect more mock passengers than agents using the suspicious signs 
method. We also hypothesised that interviews using the methods would be 
distinguished by the verbal behaviours of both passengers and agents: in CCE 
interviews, agents would speak less and passengers more, compared with suspicious 
signs interviews; CCE interviews would yield more information from passengers than 
suspicious signs interviews; the methods would differ in the question types used by 
security agents. Finally, we hypothesised that deceptive passengers interviewed under 
the CCE method would show a reduction of verbal content (number of words and 
information items) in their answers as the interview proceeded.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Security agents. Ninety-six males and 64 females (Mage = 37.4, SD = 12.73) 
from a workforce of 866 staff participated as part of normal working but were free to 
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withdraw from study participation at any time. All staff had received training in 
suspicious signs screening (two weeks classroom instruction and one week on-the-job 
training), and had an average of 4.9 years’ experience (SD = 2.81) with the method. 
Agents were aware that tests of screening effectiveness would be conducted during 
the eight-month trial, but were blind to the presence of mock passengers. Written 
consent was obtained from agents to audio-record interviews. Staff were randomly 
allocated to suspicious signs (83 agents) and CCE (77 agents) methods. Staff 
allocated to suspicious signs received no further training. Staff allocated to CCE 
underwent CCE training, comprising one week of classroom instruction (lectures, 
role-play exercises, and continuous assessment), and one week on-the-job training.  
Passengers. Two groups participated (113 male & 91 female in each group): 
mock passengers (mean age 45.7 years, SD = 5.14) and genuine passengers (mean age 
43.5 years, SD = 4.77). Nationalities matched across groups were: American (43), 
British (116), German (16), Irish (5), Swiss (11), and Canadian (13). Mock passengers 
were recruited by advertisement. Each was paid £60 to participate, with an additional 
£60 if they passed through the security interview undetected as deceptive. During 
days when audio-recordings were taken, researcher approached each passenger after 
their security interview, seeking permission for their interview to be included in the 
research. The sample of genuine passengers was selected from 7000 security 
interviews audio-recorded during the evaluation, matched to mock passengers by age, 
gender, nationality and first language. 
Procedure 
One week before participation, mock passengers provided full names, gender; 
date and place of birth, passport number, and home and work addresses. Each 
participant received an apparently valid ticket, an itinerary of flights and a deceptive 
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cover story to be maintained during the security interview, and a ticketing record was 
created on the airline electronic database.  Cover stories were unique and age- and 
gender-appropriate. For example, one participant (a male police officer from Hull) 
was told: 
You have worked as a telecoms engineer for the past three years, in 
Northampton where you grew up. You are travelling to Chicago to take part in an 
international amateur fencing competition. 
Participants were encouraged to undertake preparatory research to make their cover 
story convincing, by conducting internet searches to gather information relevant to the 
cover story. On the second and fifth days of the week prior to participation, each 
participant took part in a telephone interview with a researcher, in which they were 
asked to give a free verbal account of their cover story and the information that they 
had accessed to enrich their relevant story knowledge. A threshold for successful 
telephone interview was set, requiring participants to maintain at least two minutes of 
uninterrupted verbal account of their cover story, and to supply at least four pieces of 
information that were not included in the original cover story. All participants met 
this threshold in both interviews. On the day they attended the airport, they were told 
to dress appropriately for their destination and travel story, and to bring appropriate 
luggage and a current passport.   
Screening interviews took place prior to check-in for 88 long-haul flights. On 
arrival at the airport, each mock passenger met a researcher who used a written 
protocol to explain participation. No information was provided about security 
procedures. Mock passengers were directed individually (out of sight of security staff) 
to join genuine passengers queuing to pass through either the suspicious signs or CCE 
security process, they were then interviewed by a security agent. If an agent was not 
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satisfied with the outcome of the interview (e.g., suspicious signs were detected but 
not resolved; the veracity of an account was not established), the passenger was 
identified for further screening under a separate mandatory process. Throughout the 
trial, security agents were fitted with digital audio recorders. Signs were posted 
informing passengers that security interviews may be recorded. 
 
Results 
Detecting Deception 
Our principal interest was to determine which method was most effective for 
detecting deception (i.e., discriminating mock from real passengers). CCE agents 
identified 24 times more mock passengers (66%; 60% at month 1 and 72% at month 
6) than suspicious signs agents (3%; 6% at month 1 and 0% at month 6), χ2 (1) = 
13.091, p < .001. Discrimination accuracy was assessed using a d’ measure for each 
flight calculated from true positives (mock passengers) and false alarms (genuine 
passengers) identified as being deceptive. Agents using CCE, M CCE  = 3.016, 95% CI 
[2.65; 3.38], showed higher discrimination accuracy than agents using suspicious 
signs, M suspicious signs = 0.042, 95% CI [-.34; + .43], F (1, 136) = 119.853, p = < .001, 
ηp2 = .47. The time of testing (Month 1 vs. 6) did not affect discrimination accuracy, 
all Fs < .912, all ps > .404. 
Treating the genuine passengers who were identified as being deceptive as 
false alarms is a simplification, since it cannot be established whether they were 
mistakenly identified as deceptive or were actually being deceptive. However, base 
rates of identification of travelers identified as being deceptive in the six months prior 
to the trial (1 in 1,247 passengers) did not differ during the trial with either suspicious 
signs (1 in 1219 passengers), or CCE (1 in 1295 passengers), ps > 0.20. 
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Differences in Verbal Content 
We hypothesized that the using CCE method would make it easier to detect 
deception because it generates more passenger verbalization than the suspicious signs 
method. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed the interview audio-recordings for the 
number of words spoken by each passenger, the number of words spoken by the 
agent, the number of questions asked by the agent, the types of questions asked (open, 
closed), and the temporal reference of questions (i.e., whether the question referred to 
an event in distant past, recent past, present, near future or far future). In addition, we 
counted the number of unique information items (i.e., information unknown to the 
agent and unavailable through documentation) given in the verbal account of each 
passenger. An independent coder coded 20% of the 404 transcripts. Inter-coder 
reliability for number and types of questions, screener and passenger words, and 
information items was high: r (82) = .827, p < .001; r (82) = .901, p < .001; r (82) 
= .988, p < .001; r (82) = .899, p < .001; r (82) = .841, p < .001, respectively.  
One possibility is that agents treated mock passengers differently from real 
passengers from the outset, irrespective of the interview method being used (i.e., 
agents recognised mock passengers as being different from real passengers, so 
changed their interview approach accordingly).  As a manipulation check, between-
subjects Anovas were conducted for each of our measures that included Passenger 
Type (mock versus real) as a factor.  These analyses revealed no significant main 
effects or interactions involving Passenger type for numbers of agent questions or 
words, all Fs < .009 and all ps > .507, passenger words or information items, Fs 
< .179, all ps > .673, or open, closed question types and temporalities, Fs < .179, all 
ps > .308.  It appears that, although agents using CCE were able to detect mock 
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passengers while agents using suspicious signs could not, the way in which agents 
applied each interview method did not differ between mock and real passengers.  
Examination of the frequencies of verbal behaviors (shown in Figure 1), 
irrespective of passenger type, indicates differences between CCE and suspicious 
signs interviews. Passengers (both mock and real) screened using CCE uttered more 
words, CI 95% [254.54; 275.40], than those screened using suspicious signs, CI 95% 
[58.39; 79.25], F (1, 400) = 683.543, p < .001, η2 = .63. Passengers screened using 
CCE also revealed more information items, M CCE items = 11.64, CI 95% [11.23; 
12.05], than passengers screened using suspicious signs, M Suspicious Signs items = 0.76, CI 
95% [0.36; 1.17], F (1, 400) = 1379.924, p < .001, η2 = .77.  CCE agents uttered 
fewer words, CI 95% [118.08; 131.51], than suspicious signs agents, CI 95% [316.20; 
329.63], F (1, 400) = 1686.806, p < .001, η2 = .80. Thus, the results confirm our 
hypothesis that CCE yields more verbal behaviors from passengers. 
 
 
Fig. 1.   
Mean number of words spoken by passengers (Pax) and agents (CCE and Suspicious 
Signs: SS) as a function of interview method (N =404). 
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Turning to the verbal behaviors of agents conducting the interviews, CCE 
agents asked fewer questions, CI 95% [10.35; 11.50], than suspicious signs agents, CI 
95% [19.48; 20.64], F (1, 400) = 486.089, p < .001, η2 = .60. CCE agents asked more 
open questions, CI 95% [3.06; 3.28], than suspicious signs agents, CI 95% [0.15; 
0.37], F (1, 400) = 1376.880, p < .001, η2 = .76, and their questions covered more 
temporal domains, CI 95% [2.10; 2.25], than those of suspicious signs questions, CI 
95% [1.09; 1.24], F (1, 400) = 355.066, p < .001, η2 = .47. However, CCE agents 
asked fewer closed questions, CI 95% [1.65; 2.04], F (1, 400) = 1645.126, p < .001, 
η2 = .80, than suspicious signs agents, CI 95% [7.37; 7.76], (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2.   
Mean question types asked by agents as a function of interview method (N =404). 
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30.90) and suspicious signs interviews (M suspicious signs duration = 186.95, SD = 35.30), 
was not significant, F = 2.064, p =.152. As with other measures, no effects of 
Passenger Type (mock versus real) were found for interview duration, all Fs < 3.278, 
all ps > .071.  
Change in Verbal Content 
We also hypothesised that CCE is effective because it promotes tests of the veracity 
of passenger accounts, and these tests yield changes in the verbal behaviours of 
deceivers during an interview that can be used by security agents to discriminate them 
from truthful individuals. To test this hypothesis, we compared the number of words 
given by mock and genuine passengers in answer to the first and last open questions 
asked by a CCE security agent during an interview (i.e., comparing verbalisations 
before accounts have been challenged to verbalisations once deceptive individuals 
may have become aware that their accounts are being assessed). The number of words 
generated overall by mock passengers, M mock words = 24.80, CI 95% [23.43; 26.27], 
and genuine passengers, M genuine words = 26.54, CI 95% [25.1; 27.9] did not differ 
significantly, F (1, 199) = 2.96, p =0.087, η2 = .015. The number of words uttered in 
answer to the first open question, M first words = 28.56, CI 95% [27.10; 29.95] was 
significantly larger than the number uttered in answer to the last open question, M last 
words = 22.80, CI 95% [21.85; 23.81], F (1, 199) = 52.90, p < .001, η2 = .21. 
Importantly, the interaction between Passenger Type and Question was significant, F 
(1, 199) = 74.341, p < .001, η2 = .27. Figure 3 illustrates the interaction, and shows 
that, while mock and genuine passengers uttered similar numbers of words in answers 
to the first open question of the interview, mock passengers uttered fewer words than 
genuine passengers in in answers to the last open question. Similarly, we predicted 
that mock passengers would include fewer information items than genuine passengers 
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in their answers to the focussed questions used by agents to test the veracity of 
accounts. The number of information items generated overall by mock passengers, M 
mock items = 3.43, CI 95% [3.19; 3.67], was lower than by genuine passengers, M genuine 
items = 4.30, CI 95% [4.05; 4.54], F (1, 199) = 24.7, p < .001, η2 = .11. 
Also, the number of information items yielded in the first test cycle, M first items 
= 4.49, CI 95% [4.24; 4.74] was significantly larger than the number yielded in the 
last test cycle, M last items = 3.24, CI 95% [3.07; 3.41], F (1, 199) = 87.056, p < .001, η2 
= .30. Again, the interaction between Passenger Type and Question was significant, F 
(1, 199) = 64.925, p < .001, η2 = .25. Figure 3 illustrates this interaction, and shows 
that, while mock and genuine passengers included similar numbers of information 
items in their answers to the first test cycle of the interview, mock passengers gave 
fewer items than genuine passengers in their answers to the last test cycle. 
 
Fig. 3.   
Mean number of words and information items as a function of passenger type (mock; 
real) and question position (first; last: N =404). 
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Discussion 
The results of the field trial show a clear advantage for veracity testing over 
suspicious signs as a method for aviation security screening. CCE detected more 
mock passengers without increasing false alarm rates. With both mock and genuine 
passengers, CCE interviews yielded more passenger talk and information. At the same 
time, security agents produced less talk and asked fewer but more effective questions. 
The use of CCE changed the verbal behaviour of deceptive passengers, whose 
answers became shorter and had less information content by the end of the interview, 
while the answers of genuine passengers did not change. By using an information-
gathering approach, first asking open questions about unpredictable topics that vary in 
their temporal reference, followed by test questions that seek information an 
individual should possess if they are being truthful, it is likely that CCE minimised 
cognitive demand for legitimate passengers but increased it for deceivers (Beckman, 
2010).  
The failure of a suspicious signs approach to detect mock passengers is 
consistent with the poor performance of behavioural indicators found in laboratory 
studies of deception (see de Paulo, 3003; Bond & de Paulo, 2006), and extends this 
finding to a composite method (where more than one indicator is being sought) that is 
tested in a field setting. The difference between suspicious signs and veracity testing 
approaches parallels a distinction in the decision-making literature between System 1 
and System 2 modes of thinking (e.g., Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). System 1 
thinking uses cues in a task environment to trigger decision heuristics (e.g., Klein, 
2004).  System 2 thinking invokes more deliberative analytic decision-making and 
searches for counter-examples to initial inferences (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2006).  
Security screening using the suspicious signs approach is analogous to System 1 
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thinking in using behavioural indicators to guide decision-making. Recognition of 
environmental cues and consequent retrieval of appropriate action sequences is a 
hallmark of expert decision-making, particularly in dynamic and time-critical 
domains (Klein, 2004; Schraagen, Militello, Ormerod, & Lipshitz, 2008). However, 
this kind of System 1 expertise develops from repeated exposure to cues in a relevant 
task environment. Security agents are rarely exposed to known incidents of deception, 
and cannot develop the kinds of automated expertise in cue recognition seen in other 
expertise domains. As a consequence, behavioural indicator methods for security 
screening necessarily comprise a rigid procedure in which the kinds of indicators to 
look for are prescribed and trained. The scripted nature of a suspicious signs interview 
makes it difficult to employ psychologically validated techniques such as tactical use 
of evidence (Dando et al., 2012), tests of expected knowledge (Blair et al., 2010), and 
unexpected questions (Vrij et al, 2009). Intuitive processing in deception detection of 
the kind promoted by a suspicious signs approach exacerbates truth and lie biases in 
deception judgements (Meissner & Kassin, 2002). Although the suspicious signs 
method is only one way of implementing behaviour detection, we argue that any 
method that relies on behavioural indicators will yield disappointing results, because 
individual behavioural cues are weakly correlated with deception.  
Veracity testing is more effective than suspicious signs screening because it 
encourages a System 2 mode of thinking, in which the consistency of an individual’s 
account is assessed analytically. Veracity testing directly addresses the problem 
identified in Porter, Gustaw and ten Brinke’s (2010) Dangerous Decisions theory. 
CCE leads security agents to assess the content of individual’s account, rather than 
relying on intuitive judgements about passenger appearance and disposition. Every 
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passenger is different, and CCE enables agents to adapt their interviewing to reflect 
these differences.  
There are additional benefits of a veracity testing approach. Behavioural 
indicators associated with previous terrorist events may not predict future events; 
CCE identifies deceit in real time, allowing discovery of new kinds of threat. The 
unpredictability of CCE questioning breaks any lie script a deceiver might prepare 
(Von Hippel & Trivers, 2011), which reduces opportunities for reverse engineering of 
a security screening method and subsequent evasion by perpetrators (Chakrabarti & 
Strauss, 2002).  In contrast, the suspicious signs method comprises a fixed sequence 
of closed questions to which responses can be rehearsed (e.g., during ‘dry runs’). 
Finally, passive observation of passenger behaviours carries a risk of selective 
profiling that may disadvantage some ethnic, gender and age groups. CCE is applied 
equally to all passengers, avoiding inappropriate profile-based biases.  
In closing, we note that the sensitivity of CCE for detecting deception is 
unique. Most studies employ base rates of around 50:50 deceivers to truth-tellers. 
Here, high rates of deception detection were obtained with a base rate of less than 
1:1000 mock to genuine passengers. Thus, a more positive picture emerges of the 
contribution that can be made by psychological research to the protection of public 
safety than previously thought.  
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